



The fact that the appeal papers in the Molineux case are
now practically completed makes pertinent some allusions to-
the existing misconceptions relating to this celebrated case. It
would occasion but little surprise if these misconceptions ex-
isted only in the public mind, since the prominence of the par-
ties concerned, the enormous cost of the prosecution entailed
to the State, and the space devoted in the public prints, have
combined to obscure the legal issues involved.
In the Molineux appeal now pending, the appellant mainly
relies upon the alleged wrongful admission of the Barnet evi-
dence. Apart from its justification in this particular case, the
principle of the admission of collateral evidence can be exam-
ined in the light of abundant precedent and judicial decision.
It is one of the distinguishing principles of the English law
of evidence that the State cannot prove other independent
crimes-except in rebuttal under certain circumstances-merely
for the purpose of showing the general depravity of the defend-
ant or to serve as the basis of an inference that he committed
the crime in question. It may be stated that this rule is quali-
fied to the extent that evidence of an independent crime is ad-
missible when it is committed as part of the same common
purpose. In such a case, the test of admissibility is not its
criminality, but its relevancy. Precedent acts that are relevant
and material are clearly admissible, and but little reasoning
should suffice to show that such acts should not be precluded
merely because they happen to be criminal.
Many suppose the Barnet evidence was allowed to go to
the jury because, in the opinion of the trial judge, it came
within the foregoing principle. They argue, and with reason,
that neither the same motive nor a common purpose existed in
the two cases, nor were the acts in the same chain that led up
to the case on trial. It is very probable that if the admissibility
of the Barnet evidence were defended on this ground alone, it
would be open to serious exception.
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But we are satisfied that the State will urge the propriety
of its admission on a different ground. It will urge that on ac-
count of the peculiar manner of Barnet's death, his relations
with the accused, and other connecting circumstances, a suffi-
cient foundation was laid for the introduction of the so-called
Barnet evidence; that it was simply a decision by the Court
on a preliminary question of fact as to whether this evidence
should properly go to the jury. In such a case it does not de-
volve on the State to prove beyond all doubt and questionthat
the defendant has committed a priorcrimd. It yetremains the
duty of the jury to weigh the evidence for what it is worth,
and they must still be satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, as
to the guilt of the accused as charged in the indictment.
As to the relation the particular facts in the Molineux case
bear to these principles of the law of evidence, we, of course,
do not presume to state. We may, however, be assured that
the entire matter is in safe custody and confidently expect a
careful and luminous exposition of the law on the subject.
STATE GAME LAWS-IMPORTATION UNDER.
The close check that the Federal Commerce Clause puts
upon State legislation is again illustrated by two recent cases
involving the right to make possession of game unlawful dur-
ing the close season. A law of New York is declared unconsti-
tutional so far as it applies to imported fish. People v. Buffalo
.Fish Co., 58 N. E. 35. This overrules Phelps v. Racey, 60 N.Y.
10, where, under a similar law, a defense that the game had
been imported from Illinois and Minnesota was held unavail-
ing, it would seem because Congress had not legislated thereon.
This latter is no longer law. The right to regulate foreign and
inter-State commerce is given to Congress and imposes upon
the States the duty not to interfere. So a State cannot prevent
the importation of liquor. Leisz v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100.
The same doctrine was again applied in Minnesota v.Barbour,
136 U. S. 313, where it was held incompetent for a State to ex-
clude beef killed outside of the State, by compelling an inspec-
tion twenty-four hours before the killing. The latest pro-
nouncement is that a State cannot exclude a healthy product
like oleomargarine. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1.
It would seem, therefore, that if the States are powerless to
prohibit the importation of liquor and oleomargarine, which
they deem injurious to the public welfare, or to provide inspec-
120.
COMMENT.
tion laws considered necessary as a health regulation, they are
equally helpless to protect their own game if importation, by
making evasion of their laws easy, practically destroys their
effect. So it was held in re Davenport, 103 Fed. Rep. 540
(Cir. Ct. Wash.).
The Commerce Clause prohibits the States from putting
any direct burden upon foreign or inter-State commerce. Under
it a State can, in the exercise of its police power, interfere with
commerce indirectly, provided it acts reasonably and in good
faith. It is free to pass laws facilitating such commerce so long
as Congress remains from the field. But the line of the legiti-
mate exercise of its police power, with its indirect effect upon
commerce other than internal, is separated but by a hair's
breadth from the power that is Congress' alone. We do not
think the argument of the three dissenting judges in favor of
the State's right to legislate far enough to make its game laws
effectual, can withstand the authority of Leisz v. Hardin, 135
U. S. 100, which is directly against this power, and which it is
certainly a defect in the opinion not to mention. Of itself, the
consumption of imported game tends to preserve the local sup-
ply. If it is prevented merely because its remote effect may be
to render the evasion of game laws easier, it seems to make the
innocent suffer for the guilty, and may be objectionable as an
unreasonable restraint upon commerce. The people of one
State have a right to buy wholesome products of the people of
another, and State legislation cannot restrict this without
good cause. Minnesota v. Barbour, 136 U. S. 313.
At all events, it is too late now to question the wisdom or
unwisdom of the rule laid down in Leisz v. Hardin, supra. It
is certainly an odd result worked out under the very same
Commerce Clause, that a State which can prohibit absolutely
the exportation of its game (Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S.
519) should be powerless to restrain its importation, which is
equally effective, it is contended, to render nugatory the
object desired.
EXTRADITION TO CUBA.
In re Neely, 103 Fed. Rep. 626-31, is the first case, so far as
we know, that recognizes our protectorate over Cuba as con-
stitutional. It arose out of the notorious postal frauds.
Neely, the embezzler, fled to the United States. To meet this
very exigency, Congress passed in June, 1900, an act allowing
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extradition to any foreign country under the control of the
United States upon probable cause being shown. The proceed-
ings under this act were resisted by Neely upon two grounds,
viz., that Congress had no right to surrender an American citi-
zen to a country with a totally different criminal procedure,
and that Congress having declared Cuba to be free and inde-
pendent could neither occupy it nor exercise control there. The
sufficient answer to the first was that the criminal elects the
procedure of the place where he commits his crime. His citizen-
ship could make no difference, for it is clearly not the policy of
Congress to make of this country an asylum for criminals,
whether citizens or not. Even without a treaty, a criminal
can be surrendered by one country to another, as Spain did
"Boss" Tweed to us, in return for a similar favor on our part.
Since, then, a treaty is not needed, it is difficult to see how our
control over Cuba, whether lawful or not, could have affected
the present case. But as the proceedings were brought under
the Act of Congress which presupposed an occupation and con-
trol over foreign territory, the Court holds to the obvious view
that our occupation, rightfully undertaken as a war measure,
continues so until Congress sees fit to relinquish'it. The
soundness of this does not seem to be open to doubt.
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